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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1960
EQUITY
In Benrus Watch Company v. Weinstein Wholesale Jewelers a
temporary injunction was granted under the Ohio Fair Trade Act against
certain parties who were nonsigners of an agreement regarding resale
prices of products in which they did business. The injunction was
granted ex parte. While motions to dissolve the injunction (as well
as motions to show cause for contempt) were pending, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that the provisions of that Act which applied to non-
signers were unconstitutional? On the basis of that holding the trial
court in this case determined that the temporary injunction should be
dismissed and that the plaintiff's injunction bond should be cancelled.
The bond was to secure payment to the defendant of damages which he
might sustain by reason of the injunction if it should be finally decided
that the injunction should not have been granted. At the hearing to
dissolve the injunction defendant objected to a finding that the injunction
should have been granted without presentation of evidence. Upon dis-
solution of a temporary injunction, which it is determined should not
have been granted, the defendant has alternative methods of proceeding
to protect himself against harm. He may either cross petition in the in-
junction action or file an independent action for damages. With respect
to the independent action, the dissolution of the injunction is conclusive
evidence that the injunction ought not to have been granted. In acting
on a motion to dissolve, the court has jurisdiction to determine whether
or not the temporary injunction was properly granted. When the ques-
tion whether the injunction should or should not have been granted is
raised, the decision cannot be made without hearing evidence when a
request is made for a presentation. The court of appeals found that the
trial court had erred in ruling on the propriety of granting the original
injunction without giving the defendant an opportunity to present evi-
dence.
District Lodge 34, Lodge 804 International Association of Machinists,
AFL-CIO v. L. P. Cavett Company,8 was another case involving suit to
recover on an injunction bond. In a previous legal action an injunction
had been granted and bond posted by the plaintiff to secure the damages
which might be sustained if it were finally decided that the injunction
ought not to have been granted. After appeal through the Ohio judicial
system, in which the issuance of the injunction was sustained,' the United
1. 108 Ohio App. 525, 163 NXE.2d 406 (1959).
2. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 NXE.2d 481
(1959). See also discussion in Trade Regulation section, p. 578 infra.
3. 168 NXE.2d 619 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
4. L P. Cavett Co. v. District Lodge 34, Lodge 804, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 166 Ohio St.
508, 154 NY-2d 840 (1957).
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States Supreme Court held that the injunction should not have been
issued because the subject matter of the suit involved interstate commerce
over which the Ohio courts had no jurisdiction.5 Suit was then filed to
recover on the bond and the contention was made that since the state
courts did not have jurisdiction, no action taken by them had any validity
and that this invalidity extended to the bond and rendered it unenforcea-
ble. The court of appeals did not agree with this argument. Although
there is division among the holdings in various states, the weight of au-
thority sustains the validity of the injunction bond even though the court
in which it was issued had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
injunction.
Regard must be had not only for the rights of the plaintiff sought
to be protected and enforced, but also for the consequences resulting to
the defendant from the granting of the injunction. Applying this
familiar principal of equity, the court in Village of Richmond Heights v.
Board of County Commissioners,' in considering a request for an injunc-
tion, denied it in part. The village had brought an action to enjoin the
commissioners from taking from the village a parcel of vacant land de-
sired by the county for an addition to an airport. The village stated
that it had acquired the property and was proceeding to use it for housing
its village offices and police and fire departments and to establish thereon
park and recreational facilities for the residents of the village. Ordi-
narily, land already appropriated to a public use cannot be taken by an-
other governmental unit, but when the only land available for a particular
public work is already devoted to the public use, the power to take it may
be inferred from a comparison of the conflicting powers conferred by
statute as well as the nature of the public works respectively to be under-
taken. Ordinarily the co-equal rights of the village and the commis-
sioners to appropriate property would lead to the conclusion that first
in time is first in right, but that rule did not apply in this case. Re-
sponsible officials of the village had full knowledge that the commis-
sioners were contemplating the purchase of the property in question at
the time they bought the land. To the extent that the land was intended
to be used by the village for municipal buildings the use was reasonable
and in good faith. But, the expansion of the purpose for the acquisition
of the property to include a recreation center was induced by a desire to
thwart the acquisition of the property by the commissioners. There was
a long history of opposition by the village to the expansion of the
airport. There was no evidence of an intention on the part of the
village to expand the use of the land to include recreational facilities
5. District Lodge 34, Lodge 804, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. L. P. Cavert Co., 355 U.S. 39
(1957).
6. 166 N.E.2d 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
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prior to the approximate time that a public hearing on the airport was
set by the commissioners. The evidence reflected a lack of any bona
fide intention to develop recreational facilities within the reasonably
foreseeable future. The commissioners, in determining to improve the
airport to meet community needs rather than abandon it because of in-
adequacy, had not acted in bad faith nor abused their discretion. Con-
sequently, an injunction was granted the village, but only to the extent
that the village would be protected in its ownership of that land which
was needed for the construction of municipal buildings. One of the
judges in a dissenting opinion said:
I cannot agree with the majority in its holding, that in effect, the
same principles of equity apply in a case where an injunction against an
appropriation is sought as apply in other cases where injunction is
sought .... The Constitution and laws of Ohio have never bestowed
upon the Courts of Ohio, in an action such as this, the right to seek or
to make an equitable adjustment of the rights of the contending parties.
In effect the majority is saying that as between two governmental
subdivisions, with equal constitutional or statutory authority of ap-
propriation, and neither having by law the specific or implied authority
to appropriate from the other, regardless of the fact that the first
governmental subdivision has purchased the property for its government
uses, if the other governmental subdivision wants the property for a
public use, it shall have it unless the first governmental subdivision can
show that it needs the property more than does the second.7
In Smith v. Smith' the plaintiff and the defendant had each come
into ownership of lots in a subdivision by a succession of deeds from the
original allotters. Defendant's vendor had taken title under a deed which
contained a restrictive covenant against the manufacture or sale of in-
toxicating liquor on the premises. The deed to defendant had contained
no similar restriction. None of the deeds in the chain of title to the
plaintiff's lots contained any reference to a right of enforcement of a
restriction of this nature. The case turned on the right of the plaintiff to
enforce the restriction. The recorded plat contained no provisions set-
ting out a uniform plan with relation to such a restriction and no re-
striction on the use of the land. There was no provision in any deeds
delivered to the purchasers from the allotters notifying the purchasers
that all purchasers were subject to restrictions of this type for the benefit
of all other purchasers. The plaintiff was not allowed to enforce the
covenant since there was no showing that it had been for his benefit.
In the case of In re Greenfield,' the judge of a juvenile court sen-
tenced a newspaper photographer for contempt under Ohio Revised Code
7. Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Comm'rs, 166 NE.2d 143, 154 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1960) (dissenting opinion).
8. 165 NE.2d 799 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Domestic Relations sec-
tion, p. 511 supra.
9. 163 N.X.2d 910 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
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